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RECENT DECISIONS
between the parties cannot and does not limit the powers of the court
conferred by statute. Nevertheless, courts in awarding alimony have
no power to abrogate or modify any provisions of a separation agree-
ment without the mutual consent of the parties,12 and, though the
terms of a separation agreement have been incorporated in a subse-
quent decree of divorce, the statutory authority to modify alimony
awards does not warrant the alteration of such prior separation agree-
ment.13 The contractual obligation is still enforceable in courts of
law, but the special and drastic remedies afforded by statute "4 for
failure to adhere to an alimony judgment can be resorted to only
where there is a failure to pay the amount fixed in the modified
judgment.
S.C.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - FOREIGN DIVoRcE - JURISDICTION -
ESTOPPEL.-(First Case) Defendant and his first wife were domiciled
in this state. While retaining his residence here, defendant went to
Reno, Nevada, where he obtained a decree of divorce from his wife
who neither appeared nor was personally served in that action, but
who at all times remained a resident of New York State. Subse-
quently, defendant married the present plaintiff, who now sues him for
separation. Defendant contends this action cannot be maintained as
the Nevada decree is invalid in this state and that he is therefore not
legally married to plaintiff. Held, the Nevada court, having no juris-
diction, could not render a decree that would be valid here; 1 however,
defendant sought the judgment and may not now be heard to impeach
it.2 Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E. (2d) 290 (1940).
(Second Case) Plaintiff sues defendant for separation. Plain-
tiff had been previously married to a Canadian citizen who was a resi-
dent of Quebec. While living separate and apart from him, she met
the defendant. Solely through defendant's aid, she came to New
York and then went immediately to Nevada where she obtained upon
service by publication a divorce from her husband, in which action
both plaintiff and defendant took part. Defendant claims the Nevada
divorce is invalid. Held, plaintiff, having invoked the jurisdiction of
the Nevada court, would be estopped from denying the validity of its
2 Galusha v. Galusha, 138 N. Y. 272, 33 N. E. 1062 (1893).
13 Henderson v. Henderson, 37 Ore. 141, 60 Pac. 597 (1900).
14 See N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT §§ 1171, 1171-a, 1171-b, 1172.
'Winston v. Winston, 165 N. Y. 553, 59 N. E. 273 (1901); Hubbard v.
Hubbard, 228 N. Y. 81, 126 N. E. 508 (1920); Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N. Y.
131, 188 N. E. 279 (1933).
2 Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503, 66 N. E. 193 (1901); Hynes v.
Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 273 N. Y. 612, 7 N. E. (2d) 719 (1937) ; Brown
v. Brown, 242 App. Div. 33, 272 N. Y. Supp. 877 (4th Dept. 1934).
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decree; 8 defendant, who aided her, is likewise estopped.4  Oldham v.
Oldham, 174 Misc. 22, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 667 (1940).
It has been the policy of our courts to refuse to recognize the
validity of divorces obtained in other states upon grounds insufficient
for that purpose in this state.5 It was held in the decisive case of
Haddock v. Haddock 6 that the mere domicile within the state of one
party to the marriage does not give the courts of that state jurisdiction
to render a decree of divorce enforceable in all the other states by
virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution 7
against a non-resident who did not appear and was only constructively
served with notice of the pendency of the action. The decree may,
however, be recognized by a sister state where not against its public
policy under principles of comity, of which the courts of each state
are the final arbiters.8
A party who has invoked the aid of a court and procured a judg-
ment or decree to be entered in his favor may not question the juris-
diction of the court to which he has voluntarily submitted himself.9
The Krause and Oldham cases are in accord with the well-settled law
on this point and it is this principle which we find to be the turning
point of both decisions. The public policy of the state will not permit
one to impeach a decree obtained at his instance and in' his own
behalf,10 and one who participates in the wrongful act of obtaining an
3 Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E. (2d) 290 (1940).
4 Kaufman v. Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1st Dept.
1917).
5 Cross v. Cross, 108 N. Y. 628, 15 N. E. 333 (1888) ; De Meli v. De Meli,
120 N. Y. 485, 24 N. E. 996 (1890); Williams v. Williams, 130 N. Y. 193,
29 N. E. 98 (1891); Matter of Kimball, 155 N. Y. 62, 49 N. E. 331 (1898);
Winston v. Winston, 165 N. Y. 553, 59 N. E. 273 (1901) ; Hubbard v. Hubbard,
228 N. Y. 81, 126 N. E. 508 (1920) ; Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N. Y. 131, 188
N. E. 279 (1933).6 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525 (1906).
7 U. S. CoNs. Art. IV, § 1.
8 Note (1909) 18 L. R. A. 647. It is said therein that so long as the
doctrine of the Haddock case stands, it is clear that, with the exception of cases
where the defendant was actually or constructively domiciled at the divorce
forum, and with the possible exception of cases where, though the defendant
may have legally acquired a separate domicile elsewhere, the last common
matrimonial domicile of the parties was at the divorce forum, the question as
to the recognition in one state of a decree of divorce rendered in another upon
constructive service of process without appearance by the defendant does not
involve any consideration of the full faith and credit clause.
9 Bledsoe v. Seaman,. 77 Kan. 679, 95 Pac. 576 (1908); Starbuck v. Star-
buck, 173 N. Y. 503, 66 N. E. 193 (1901) ; Kelsey v. Kelsey, 204 App. Div. 116,
197 N. Y. Supp. 371 (4th Dept. 1922); Brown v. Brown, 242 App. Div. 33,
272 N. Y. Supp. 877 (4th Dept. 1934) (holding that defendant might not
impugn the validity of the marriage by proof that a judgment of divorce pre-
viously obtained by him in a foreign state was invalid for lack of jurisdiction
and that his former wife being living, he was incapable of entering into a valid
marriage with the plaintiff); People ex rel. Shrady v. Shrady, 47 Misc. 333,
95 N. Y. Supp. 991 (1905).
10 Matter of Ellis "Estate, 55 Minn. 401, 56 N. W. 1056 (1893) ; Kinnier v.
Kinnier, 45 N. Y. 535 (1871); Hewitt v. Northrup, 75 N. Y. 506 (1878);
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invalid decree is legally bound by the effects and consequences of his
action." Citing the case of Kaufinan v. Kaufnman,12 Justice Mc-
Laughlin in the Oldham case declared, "If the plaintiff could be
estopped from"contesting the validity of the decree of the Nevada
court, so too the defendant should also be estopped because he and
she were both principals in the acts that were necessary for the ob-
taining of a decree of divorce. Whatever doubt there might be as to
the application of the doctrine of estoppel to contest the validity of a
divorce by one of the parties to it, that question was settled by the
Court of Appeals in the action of Krause v. Krause." 13
R.G.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-INJUNCTION PROCEEDINGS TO RESTRAIN
FOREIGN DIvoRcE.-Plaintiff-wife seeks a judgment permanently re-
straining defendant from prosecuting an action against her for divorce
in a Florida court. In her complaint she alleges that the parties,
residents of New York State, were married here and that they are
now and have been for the last twelve years living in this state where
the defendant is engaged in business. The Special Term granted a
temporary injunction which has been upheld on appeal by the Appel-
late Division. The Appellate Division, however, allowed an appeal
to the Court of Appeals and certified the following question: "'Does
the complaint herein state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
for injunctive relief?" Held, reversed, and complaint dismissed. The
question certified is answered in the negative. Goldstein v. Goldstein,
283 N. Y. 146, 27 N. E. (2d) 969 (1940).
The malicious prosecution of an action in a court having no juris-
diction of the subject-matter is not an injury for which an injunction
will lie. A court of equity will not award the extraordinary relief of
injunction, except in cases where some legal wrong has been done or
is threatened.' It is, therefore, a matter of primary necessity that one
who would seek the aid of the courts in an action of this nature should
allege that a legal right has been infringed, or that a legal wrong has
Van Koughnet v. Dennie, 6 Hun 179, 22 N. Y. Supp. 823 (1893); Matter of
Morrison, 52 Hun 102, 5 N. Y. Supp. 90 (1889).
21Kaufman v. Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1st
Dept. 1917).
12 The court in that case found, "If she would not be heard to question the
validity of the divorce, and could not have her marriage with plaintiff annulled
on the ground that the divorce was invalid, why should he, who induced her to
obtain it and then to marry him on the assumption that she was free to do so
be heard to question its validity?"
13 Oldham v. Oldham, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 667, 668 (1940).
' Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929) ("Whether
there exist or is threatened a legal wrong to be restrained and a legal right to be
protected is, in the absence of disputed questions of fact, a question of law").
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